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I. Introduction
Public diplomacy is a term frequently used in recent years both in
international relations circles and the media. Only during that time has it become
an accepted part of the foreign policy machine within government, but as a
concept public diplomacy has existed for much longer. Whether called
psychological operations (as it is in the U.S. military) or information
dissemination (as within organizations such as the U.S. Information Agency)
public diplomacy has been exercised for decades. With the establishment of high
profile positions for public diplomacy within the U.S. government during the last
several years, it has become more prominent as a field of practice. Public
diplomacy is an essential and underutilized branch of the foreign policy world. It
has the potential to improve relationships with other nations, foster understanding
between cultures, and promote global education and engagement for Americans.
It also reinforces democratic principles by recognizing public citizens as important
players in their own countries and on the global stage. Most importantly, it has the
ability to accomplish its primary goal: building widespread support for American
foreign policy.
In a world of declining American influence and increasing hostility toward
American policies, public diplomacy will be the lynchpin in any successful foreign
policy in the coming years. A rapidly globalizing world has given a voice to
billions of previously unheard individuals. These individuals must be the targets
2

of public diplomacy efforts. Continued democratization around the world means
more and more that the will of the people will drive government action. The
distinction here is important: as a nation, America cannot focus solely on
garnering support among foreign governments. We must also win favorability
with the citizens.
An important distinction must be made between public diplomacy and
propaganda. Very negative connotations surround the idea of propaganda, and
while both fields are concerned with informational campaigns, public diplomacy is
based on other components. Two primary differences separate these fields. First,
public diplomacy is not unidirectional. An important objective is to inform
foreign audiences of American values, but equally important are efforts to inform
Americans of foreign opinions. Second, cultural and educational exchanges are
crucial areas of public diplomacy, as they prove mutually beneficial to both
cultures. Propaganda is not centered on the free exchange of ideas and cultures
the way public diplomacy is. Also, the government is not the only player in public
diplomacy; it is a practice that draws from multinational corporations and private
citizens, in addition to government entities.
At the heart of American public diplomacy lie the American people. With
their voices positive messages about American life are carried around the world.
With a government often struggling with public diplomacy, and working with
declining cultural capital, the people provide a sound alternative to educate a new
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generation of foreign friends. Public diplomacy offers a rare arena in which the
actions of people can make up for the deficiencies of government.
For centuries, the public was largely excluded from the policy realm, but
with the advent of liberal democratic societies has come an onslaught of
information and public opinion. The story of English diplomat Harold Nicolson is
well known in international relations because his writings and observations
capture a shift between old and new diplomacy. Early in his life, as a member of
the British foreign service, Nicolson was a Wilsonian idealist who viewed the
League of Nations as the solution to all international problems. 1 He accepted
Satow’s definition of diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the
conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.” 2
This definition characterizes old diplomacy through its focus on government-togovernment encounters, and was based on a model with a sovereign head of state.
Let down by the failures of the Wilsonian model, Nicolson began writing as a
realist who recognized a sort of new diplomacy in which sovereignty lies with the
people. 3 Because of the changing nature of sovereignty, diplomacy itself needed
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to adapt: “The conflict between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ diplomacy is…in this long
process of adjustment,” Nicolson wrote. 4
Public diplomacy accepts “new” diplomacy and focuses on influencing
foreign audiences. While traditional diplomacy continues to play a critical role in
the international system, public diplomacy responds to public opinion, which is
very important in societies where the people can vote out public officials. Viewed
this way, effective public diplomacy has a trickle-up effect, starting with shaping
the opinions of the public audience, which then manifests itself in electoral
outcomes. Through such actions, state leaders are indirectly targeted by public
diplomacy.
The purpose of this essay is three-fold. The first section provides history
and analysis of public diplomacy from 1942-2007, including its structural
organization within the U.S. government. The section includes an analysis of how
public diplomacy has been transformed as the result of the War on Terror. The
second section describes the most recent programs and initiatives in American
public diplomacy. Thirdly, I offer a section of policy recommendations and
conclusions, ultimately calling for more indirect approaches to public diplomacy
in order to improve American credibility.
Two major problems will be addressed at various points throughout the
essay. There is widespread disagreement over what the role of public diplomacy
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should be exactly. This disagreement has led to detrimental inconsistencies, most
obviously in the rapidly shifting structure of the public diplomacy establishment.
There are also important questions about the scope of public diplomacy. Is it
anything more than public affairs or publicity? There is a fine line between the
information programs of public diplomacy and propaganda. What characteristics
of public diplomacy distinguish it as an independent and necessary part of the
foreign policy process? These questions will be addressed from various
perspectives.

II. Public Diplomacy: Structure and Practice
The concept of public diplomacy is relatively new, at least compared to ageold international interactions, such as bargaining, trade and war. Because of the
rise of accessible information in the twentieth century, the opinion of foreign
audiences became increasingly more prominent and influential. The actual term,
public diplomacy, was coined and defined in 1965 as the “cause and effect of
public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of
foreign policy.” 5 Public diplomacy can be broken down into three different
functions: information programs, educational exchanges and cultural exchanges.
This section offers an examination of some important attempts at public
5
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diplomacy by the U.S. government and the structure of the public diplomacy
establishment within the government, beginning with an overview of some
programs that are widely known, if not widely understood as efforts in public
diplomacy.

Public diplomacy: information programs and cultural exchange
America’s first experiment with public diplomacy was part of the strategic
communications tactics that helped the U.S. and its European allies defeat Axis
troops. It came in the form of a radio program that today is known around the
globe, Voice of America. In January 1942, the U.S. government began purchasing
small blocks of time on national broadcast networks to inform listeners about the
day-to-day events of the war. Broadcasters made a pledge that the news would be
honest, whether the news was good or bad. 6 At its inception, VOA was organized
under the Office of War Information, and its programs targeted areas that had
already fallen under Nazi occupation. Quickly, the program expanded to various
markets around the world, often partnering with local media to gain airtime.
During the war, the American Broadcasting Station was founded in Europe,
establishing an enduring precedent for the availability of American media in
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Europe. 7 By the end of the war, VOA provided broadcast services in 40
languages. 8
For a first trial in modern public diplomacy—modern because the
effectiveness of the entire operation depended upon the relatively new technology
of radio—Voice of America proved successful. It is difficult to quantify the role it
played in winning over audiences worldwide, but America had undoubtedly found
new and useful methods for effectively disseminating information. Other
countries followed, creating their own external broadcasting programs modeled
after VOA; however, some criticized its objectivity because of its government
association. VOA continued doing important work after WWII, taking on
communist ideology during the Cold War. Although its effectiveness was
witnessed in Europe, it still had detractors among those in Congress and the
mainstream media. The Associated Press and United Press stopped providing
news material to VOA, fearing government interference. 9 They worried their
collaboration with a government entity undermined their journalistic credibility.
In the early years of the Cold War, an ideological clash developed between
the foreign policy establishment and politicians, with the latter adopting a more
traditional view of how diplomacy should be conducted—old diplomacy, to use
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Nicolson’s terminology. To them, this new realm of public diplomacy, because of
government oversight, constituted an unnecessary expansion of the federal
government. Some Congressional leaders believed that foreign policy mattered
far less than the domestic political agenda. 10 This discord led to various and major
restructurings of the foreign policy establishment in America, particularly in the
area of global communications and exchanges.
The most well-known public diplomacy program is the Fulbright exchange
program, which, since its creation in 1946, has sent thousands of Americans to
universities abroad to conduct graduate research or teach. The program is funded
through Congressional appropriations and had a budget of $262 million in 2007.
Although cost is shared by host countries and institutions, the United States
provides a vast majority of funding. More than 6,000 grants were awarded in
2007, sending researchers and teachers to 155 countries. 11 The cultural benefit is
not one-sided; since the program’s inception 46,000 Americans and 150,000
students from other countries have participated in Fulbright exchanges. Although
the program has been an unquestionable success, funding remains limited. The
FY 2007 State and Foreign Operations budget request was $35,116,000,000, and
the total earmarked for educational and cultural exchanges was $474,000,000. 12
In other words, only 1.34% of the requested funds were for educational exchanges,
10
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with Fulbright being the flagship program. With a proven program such as this
one, better funding would insure even greater results.

The structure of public diplomacy within the U.S. government
The failure to set clear goals for public diplomacy hinders its organization
and implementation. Because its scope lacks clear definition, it is difficult to
organize effectively; on the other hand, because of poor structuring, the scope of
public diplomacy is ill defined.
The strategic communications sector of the national security and foreign
policy bureaucracy seeks to use communication tactics to further the interests of
America abroad. Yet, it is difficult to communicate externally when internal
organization is unstable. During the Second World War, three organizations held
responsibilities within the strategic communications sector: the Office of War
Information, the Office of Strategic Services (later rechristened the CIA) and the
division within the Army that practiced psychological warfare. 13 The onset of the
Korean War sparked renewed interest in public diplomacy, but no overarching
organization existed that would enable it to be used as an effective tool. President
Eisenhower provided an intended solution to this organizational problem with the
creation of the United States Information Agency in 1953. USIA assumed
responsibility for broadcasting and information functions; however, the
13

Laurie, Clayton D. The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany.
1996.

10

educational and cultural exchange components of public diplomacy continued to
operate through the State Department. 14
Voice of America was now under the auspices of USIA, but other
governmental agencies still had a hand in broadcasting, most notably the CIA,
which launched radio programs in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (known as
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, respectively). Of course, CIA involvement
in these programs was covert. Because of the various and often competing
organizations involved in public diplomacy, interagency coordination was
problematic. Efforts were made to coordinate public diplomacy efforts through
the creation of a Psychological Strategy Board, established during the Truman
years and falling under the control of the National Security Council. Although the
Eisenhower administration established a similar policy coordination office through
the NSC, those efforts fell by the wayside until the Reagan administration.
The 1970’s marked a time of significant organizational change to the public
diplomacy machine, beginning with the exposure of CIA involvement with Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. With the possibility that these two broadcast
networks could be shut down, Congress created a Board for International
Broadcasting in 1973 to oversee operations.15 During this decade several studies
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and commissions examined and evaluated American public diplomacy. 16 As a
result, major restructuring took place with regard to the educational and cultural
components of public diplomacy. Historically, the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (ECA) within the State Department oversaw cultural and
educational exchanges. But in 1977, President Carter removed this bureau from
State and made it a part of USIA, and also changed the name of USIA to the U.S.
International Communications Agency. The new agency redefined the mission of
public diplomacy. The primary goal of public diplomacy was still to influence
foreign audiences and expose them to American culture. Now, a new, second
purpose was added de facto through the new International Communications
Agency: to give Americans “the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures,
and problems of others, so that we can come to understand their hopes,
perceptions and aspirations.” 17 This exemplifies the ever-changing nature and
purpose of public diplomacy, especially as it relates to coming and going political
administrations. President Carter’s intention was clearly to promote mutual
understanding, yet his goal of educating Americans about foreign cultures reached
beyond the generally accepted scope of public diplomacy.
One positive result of the studies and commissions of the 1970’s was that it
provided some distance between the government and its attempts at public
16
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diplomacy. This separation between policy and information dissemination allowed
State to focus solely on policy planning and implementation, and the ICA to focus
on information dissemination and cultural exchange. The outcome was the
legitimization of public diplomacy initiatives, which could now be seen as more
independent, rather than so closely tied up with government policy planners.
The Stanton Commission was a notable 1970’s study of public diplomacy.
It made policy recommendations contrary to what President Carter implemented
through strengthening the International Communications Agency and the
extraction of educational programs from State. 18 The suggestions were founded
upon one general idea: that if the State Department was responsible for
information programs, the department would be more accurate and timely in its
efforts, promoting both accountability and accuracy. It was not until 1998 that the
Stanton approach was ultimately adopted. The U.S. Information Agency (it was
given back its original name in the previous decade) was folded into the State
Department. Voice of America and Radio Free Broadcasts were removed from
USIA in 1994 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Board of
Governors by an act of Congress. 19 Thus, effectively, with the abolition of USIA
in 1998, State regained the control over ECA, which it had lost twenty years
before. Also at this time, Congress created a high-ranking position within State,
the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs. This was a step in the
18
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right direction; however, like all cabinet positions the office holder depends on
who controls the White House. The organization of public diplomacy was
streamlined through this decision, but still it lacked cohesive long-term goals and
methods.

The State Department and public diplomacy
The undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs oversees a
variety of initiatives, including educational and cultural exchanges, and
international information programs. On the public affairs side, the State
Department spokesman reports directly to the undersecretary, meaning that s/he
has a direct impact on the daily message coming from the department.
Information provided by the department spokesman is used in domestic and
international media. The attention of the undersecretary is divided between these
two components, although the position was created to heighten the profile of
public diplomacy and to demonstrate the commitment of a high-level government
official to its successful operation.
Besides the undersecretary, there are in fact hundreds of State Department
officials whose careers are dedicated to public diplomacy. They are members of
the U.S. Foreign Service who chose public diplomacy as their career track (the
department calls this a career cone—the five cones are made up of officers
specializing in political, economic, and consular affairs, as well as management
and public diplomacy). According to several Foreign Service officers in the
14

public diplomacy cone, training in this specialty is weak when compared to other
Foreign Service careers. 20 All FSO’s spend their first few years working in
consular affairs, approving visas for foreign students and travelers. Yet when it
comes time for a public diplomacy officer to serve in that capacity, there is little
definition of expectations. In many ways, this career cone is the catch-all, doing
pieces of the work that political or economic officers might do, but with a focus on
public relations. If their focus was truly public diplomacy, they would work solely
with educational and information programs, and would consult with local media.
Such grassroots forms of public diplomacy are unique because they target to
certain audiences. There should be clear expectations and homogenized efforts
among public diplomacy officers to provide consistency. Without such clarity, it
is challenging to examine the effectiveness of public diplomacy because too much
is left to the discretion of individual officers. The result is work that is too fluid,
changing from person to person and administration to administration. No guiding
principles or long-term goals are established, and this lack of foresight damages
the potential of diplomats to consistently impact foreign audiences. Large
programs with oversight, such as foreign aid, have had more visible results than
individual efforts in public diplomacy.

20
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Foreign aid and public diplomacy
There are strong ties between the goals of public diplomacy and the billions
of dollars of U.S. foreign aid spent each year. Foreign aid is not a type of public
diplomacy; economic power is classic hard power. Yet, the goals of foreign aid
and of public diplomacy are complementary. Both share a commitment to forging
strong bonds in an effort to foster goodwill and understanding of American culture
and policies.
The Marshall Plan was successful in rebuilding Europe and creating strong
ties with our Western allies. 21 It demonstrated America’s commitment to
providing relief for its friends and to strengthening the global economy. Agencies
such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have played a
critical role in foreign policy for the last half-century. The Millennium Challenge
Account, introduced by President Bush in 2002, called for a five-fold increase in
foreign aid and restructured distribution methods. 22 There are four ways in which
MCA is different from preexisting aid programs. First, its purpose is aimed at
economic growth and development and is not tied to other foreign policy
objectives. Second, it rewards countries that practice sound economic policies.
Third, bureaucratic costs are reduced, and fourth, recipients have a greater say in
implementing the aid programs. The separation between policy and aid serves to
21
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strengthen both. It demonstrates altruism on the part of the U.S. government and
invests more power in recipients of the aid. Giving more oversight to the people
shares similarities with the goals of public diplomacy because it assumes that in
states that are democratic or democratizing, public opinion will influence state
policies. By empowering people instead of governments, America fosters trust and
goodwill among those whose governments may be an adversary.
Foreign opinion polls reveal that many underdeveloped countries have a
negative opinion of America and its policies. 23 Rather than decreasing our
engagement with these countries, it is crucial that the U.S. continues to strengthen
interactions while seeming less focused on its own agenda. Foreign audiences
must believe that accepting U.S. aid does not by association mean accepting all
U.S. policies. This dilemma is explained well through James Fearon’s concept of
audience costs. Fearon examines how domestic political audiences impact a
nation’s incentive to give in during international disputes 24 . While his scholarship
pertains more to acts of war, his findings ring true when examining public
diplomacy. His thesis relies heavily on the notion of the democratic peace: “If
democracies are better able to communicate their intentions and to make
international commitments, then the security dilemma may be somewhat
moderated between them.” In other words, democracies communicate best with
23
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other democracies. One serious problem with American public diplomacy is that
often, the foreign audience is non-democratic. Because audience costs are a social
invention, they depend on the type of government. Autocratic leaders of Middle
East countries have few audience costs when they engage in anti-American
rhetoric. Even if a majority of their population disagreed with such rhetoric, it
would have little effect on the country’s government. Imagine, on the other hand,
that a leader of a democratic society were to engage in anti-American rhetoric.
S/he will eventually be judged by their domestic political audience.

How technology has impacted public diplomacy and public opinion
Information technology is crucial because it has the capacity to engage
whole audiences, not just the political elite of a given country. Wide availability
of a message can lead to widespread opinions about America. In August 1994, the
Washington Times published an article called “The Death of an Agency,” harshly
critiquing the U.S. Information Agency and its newest approach to disseminating
information—the Internet: “How many computer whizzes are there in China or
Burma or Cuba or Tibet, or Russia for that matter?” 25 Public diplomacy has a
long tradition of adopting the latest technology, from radio to film to television
and most recently the Internet. The Washington Times may have had a point in
1994, but over a decade later it is apparent that USIA was ahead of its time.

25
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Zogby International is well known for providing reliable polling data
around the world. Polls released in 2002, 2005 and 2006 reveal a trend concerning
how America is viewed in the Middle East:

Opinion of the United States (2002)
Favorable

Unfavorable

Saudi Arabia

12

87

Egypt

15

76

Morocco

38

61

Jordan

34

61

Lebanon

26

70

Opinion of the United States (2005)
Favorable

Unfavorable

Saudi Arabia

9

89

Egypt

14

85

Morocco

34

64

Jordan

33

62

Lebanon

32

60

Opinion of the United States (2006)

19

Favorable

Unfavorable

Saudi Arabia

12

82

Egypt

14

83

Morocco

7

87

Jordan

5

90

Lebanon

28

68

The data conclude that positive views of America in the Middle East have
drastically declined. While this certainly reflects feelings generated by the
unpopular war in Iraq, these low numbers also indicate that public diplomacy is
failing in the region. Although such disapproval is unsettling, those numbers
provide insight that was unavailable before the advent of the information age. If
so many in the Muslim world are dissatisfied with American policy, it is critical to
understand why before significant improvements can be made to the public
diplomacy efforts to reshape their opinions.
The Pew Global Attitudes Project is perhaps the best-known poll that
gauges public perception of the United States. The questions cover many topics,
but touch on opinions of foreign governments and foreign people. Often
respondents dislike a country, but like its people. The results for countries such as
Jordan and Turkey demonstrate an important gap between the negativity
associated with the U.S. government, as opposed to the American people.

20

Question: What is your opinion of the United States: favorable, unfavorable or
undecided?
Country
Great Britain

Favorable
56%

Unfavorable
33%

Undecided
11%

Egypt

30%

69%

1%

Jordan

15%

85%

0%

Turkey

12%

76%

12%

Question: What is your opinion of Americans: favorable, unfavorable or
undecided?
Country
Great Britain

Favorable
69%

Unfavorable
21%

Undecided
10%

Egypt

36%

63%

1%

Jordan

38%

61%

1%

Turkey

17%

69%

14%

*From the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006.

Public diplomacy relies heavily on the notion of promoting American
culture and showing foreign audiences the “real” America. The above data,
therefore, are encouraging because they demonstrate an opening to convey

21

American values to foreign audiences without directly attaching those values to
the government. Walter Russell Mead writes that, “American sweet power,
though limited and variable, clearly plays an important role in winning sympathy
and support for American foreign policy around the world.” 26 Indeed, there is an
opportunity for public diplomacy to contribute to improved approval numbers for
America. Ideally, convergence in the two above data sets would indicate
successful public diplomacy. Once foreign audiences look favorably upon the
government and the American people, it will be less important to detach public
diplomacy initiatives from the government because of lack of popularity.
The greatest downside to polls conducted by the Pew Center is that the data
are so comprehensive it takes several years to compile and release, resulting in
sometimes outdated information. More rapid polling information would allow
public diplomatists to quantify improvements in opinion polls as they relate to
public diplomacy. Yet, having this information is an advantage over what was
known about worldwide perception of America a generation ago. Because
improvements in technology and communication have allowed better access to a
diverse array of media and information resources, the discipline of diplomacy has
changed how it envisions its tasks and performs its functions. No longer is
diplomacy strictly conceived of in the traditional sense of government-togovernment negotiations.

26
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What we learn from the structure of public diplomacy
The structure of the public diplomacy shop within the foreign policy
establishment is revealing of its place on the diplomatic priority list. Public
diplomacy is faced with definitional problems that do not exist in policy planning
or diplomatic management. There are strict guidelines for how embassies are run;
there is a process in place for creating and implementing policy; the resources the
State Department provides to Americans and foreigners is straightforward. Public
diplomacy itself, however, is not straightforward.
Those with a more traditional, realist perspective of international relations
question the effectiveness of soft power altogether. Realists believe hard power
and self-interest are the key determinants to creating policy. Decisions are
instinctively made based on the best outcome for the decision-maker. Hans
Morgenthau argued that “rational foreign policy [is] good foreign policy; for only
rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence,
complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of
success.” 27 The focus of the foreign policy establishment continues to be military
and economic power, not cultural power. Until a happy medium can be found
between hard and soft power—which is difficult due to constantly changing

27

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

23

circumstances in the world environment—the role of public diplomacy will remain
unclear.
The constant restructuring and reorganization over the past sixty years tells
us that public diplomacy is still finding its place. As an academic field, it is not
studied nearly as much as traditional diplomacy and international relations, with
their focus on military and economic issues. Only three American universities
have centers dedicated entirely to the academic study of public diplomacy, George
Washington University, the University of Southern California, and Tufts
University 28 . If more information were available in academia on this subject, it
would create a new academic branch of the foreign policy establishment and help
the field of public diplomacy find its place within international affairs. Currently,
the field lacks a strong theoretical framework which more widespread academic
analysis would provide.

III. Public Diplomacy After September 11
Some of the most fascinating and significant developments in the realm of
public diplomacy have happened since the September 11 attacks. The changes
result from a world altered by terrorism, but also by a global society vastly
improved thanks to technological advancements. Christopher Ross, who is a
28
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special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the State
Department, provides a vivid description of how public diplomacy has changed in
recent years:
“A full generation ago, for instance, small teams of U.S. Foreign Service
officers drove Jeeps to the hinterlands of Latin American and other remote
regions of the world to show reel-to-reel movies to isolated audiences,
while U.S. diplomats in capital cities scouted out future leaders and sent
them on exchange programs to experience life, society, and democratic
values in the United States firsthand. That world now seems impossibly
quaint, and the contrast with today’s global environment could hardly be
more pronounced.” 29
The rise and spread of American multinational corporations, as well as nongovernmental organizations, have impacted the interaction foreign audiences have
with “America,” or at least the representations of America they see from their
various perspectives.
In the weeks immediately following the September 11 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Council on Foreign Relations established an
Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, bringing together prominent
leaders of the foreign policy community to make suggestions to the U.S.
government on how to improve America’s image abroad. The criticisms and
recommendations found in a November 6, 2001, release from the Council on
Foreign Relations provide critical insight about where public diplomacy stood at
the time just before and just after the invasion of Afghanistan. The task force, less
than two months into the war, was bold to say that winning the battle for public
29
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support abroad is of equal importance as the military operations in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who co-chaired the task force, made headlines
when he publicly asked, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s
leading communications society?” His question exposed a difficult truth for the
American public, as well as policymakers: public diplomacy and international
communications had failed, and as a result there now existed a large group of
individuals with an impression of America so negative it was deadly.
Suggestions made by the task force were numerous, and some of them
called for drastic changes to the bureaucracy, which has experienced one change
after another since WWII. A few notable suggestions included: 30
 Employing modern public relations research and polling techniques
 Creating a Public Diplomacy Advisory Board, including academics and
business professionals from a variety of backgrounds, to demonstrate that
voices from outside the traditional policy establishment are heard
 Aggressively recruit speakers of Arabic, Dari, Pashto and Farsi into the
U.S. Government, looking past misplaced security concerns that have
prevented such recruitment in the past
 Create a Radio Free Afghanistan broadcast and increase the presence of
Voice of America in the region
Because the task force made so many recommendations, and called for such
sweeping changes regarding the practice of public diplomacy, one can reasonably
conclude that public diplomacy prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was
only partially effective. It seems that an entire region of the world was neglected,
and as a result, not exposed to American ideas and values the way foreigners in
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friendly parts of the world might have been. This invited frustration and
resentment toward American policies, and ultimately created an environment
friendly to extremism based on harming American interests. Ironically, the
audiences and the regions most in need of enhanced public diplomacy efforts are
the ones that share the most ideological differences with America. Therefore, it is
difficult to express American messages in a clear and convincing way, without
seeming to impose a foreign ideology.
In 2002, the independent task force released another report, this time more
critical of American policies: “The United States will need to modify not simply
the implementation of its foreign policies but, in certain cases, the foreign policies
themselves.” 31 The task force’s most important observation concerning public
diplomacy centered on credibility. Essentially, it argued that America lacks
credibility in the Middle East, and that allies with more credibility must be used to
send American messages. Within traditional international relations literature, the
idea of credible signals was introduced by Thomas Schelling. He suggests that
states send signals to one another through their actions, and that in order to be
effective, these actions must have credibility: “If the commitment is ill-defined
and ambiguous—if we leave ourselves loopholes through which to exit, our
opponent will expect us to…exit.” 32 The idea itself is intuitive, regardless of
31
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whether you are talking about bargaining, negotiations or strategic
communications. Shouldn’t public diplomacy, first and foremost, be believable?
If it is not, all public diplomacy efforts will be ineffective. The task force
recommended the following changes in order to improve credibility: 33
 Use foreign governments and diplomats to interact with governments that
may be suspicious of U.S. intentions
 Employ Arab-American businessmen, professional and celebrities to carry
messages to the Arab world in order to foster a sense of mutual
understanding
 Create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy that would be free from
government involvement to bridge the gap between public and private
sector initiatives
Examining public diplomacy policymakers and academics the opportunity to
evaluate what exactly is working and what is not. There is little disagreement over
the fact that in the past, public diplomacy has been mismanaged, overshadowed
and underestimated, but by viewing public diplomacy in a current context, more
accurate conclusions can be drawn and policy recommendations can be made.
New diplomacy should be the rubric used to evaluate the success of American
efforts. Similarly, there must be commitment to public diplomacy on the part of
the U.S. government. Otherwise, credibility is difficult to achieve. Kurt Gaubatz,
a scholar who studies the foreign policies of democratic states as they relate to
commitment, writes, “A state makes a commitment to a course of action when it
creates a subjective belief on the part of others that it will carry through with a
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certain course of action.” 34 He calls for consistency of methods and purpose.
Such consistency would render public diplomacy more effective.
Public diplomacy is used to influence foreign audiences, indirectly
influencing sovereigns of foreign governments; therefore, the opinion of the
people serves as a measurement of success. Here is where the U.S-led efforts
against terrorism stand in terms of public opinion:

Question: Which of the following phrases comes closer to describing your view? I
favor the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the U.S.-led efforts to
fight terrorism.
Country

Favor

Oppose

Undecided

Great Britain

49%

42%

10%

Egypt

10%

82%

8%

Jordan

16%

74%

10%

Turkey

14%

77%

9%

*From the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006.

We must understand how America is viewed and interpreted around the
world, but understanding the paradigms of other cultures has proved challenging.
Neglecting public opinion undermines efforts, yet when public opinion is
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incongruent with American preferences, a balance must somehow be reached.
With the “stay the course” policies of the Bush administration, a dangerous
mindset has taken hold in the policy world that says policies should not change
according to public opinion. 35 Because of this, American policies can be
construed to be hard-headed, self-interested, irresponsible and even imperialistic
because of such strong rhetoric. This is not to suggest that policy should change
every time there is a shift in opinion polls, but it would be foolish to think that
policies should never change.
From that same perspective, it is important not to misread the data
presented above. We cannot assume that respondents do not favor fighting
terrorism; this poll suggests that they disagree with U.S. tactics, most likely
because of opposition to the unpopular war in Iraq. With important national
security matters such as this, is it more important to achieve our goals or to
achieve our goals our way? That truly is a matter of a person’s own worldview,
but the question pertains to public diplomacy in very real ways. There is an
opening for the United States to achieve its goals through surrogates—allies,
private businesses, individuals—instead of every action being seen as the direct
decision of the government.
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IV. Recent Initiatives in Public Diplomacy
During her tenure as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, Karen Hughes brought about significant changes to public diplomacy. Her
office produced a quarterly newsletter providing the most up-to-date information
concerning developments in U.S. public diplomacy. 36 Most of the
recommendations made by more than thirty studies on public diplomacy were
implemented under her leadership, leading to significant changes in education and
cultural exchange, as well as informational initiatives.

Changes in education and cultural exchange
After September 11, the number of student visas issued to foreign
university students fell dramatically. Mostly this was derived from misplaced
security concerns. Educational exchanges are more important than ever. By
educating a class of young, international students, America has the opportunity to
make a positive impression and have de facto spokespeople for America return to
their home country after their exchange. Undersecretary Hughes made this a top
priority, and by 2006 the number of student visas issued not only rose to pre-9/11
levels, but set a new record for the most visas in a year, with 591,000 student visas
granted.37 A similar commitment has strengthened the Fulbright Program, causing
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it to reach record levels. A new Fulbright exchange attracts the world’s best
scientific minds to study in America. A program called Citizen Dialogue sends
Muslim Americans overseas to talk with various Muslim communities, and vice
versa. More than 600 Muslim scholars have visited the U.S. in the last two of
years as a result. Other innovative cultural exchanges involve sending sports icons
and celebrities to represent America abroad, such as Cal Ripken, Jr., and Michelle
Kwan 38 .
The State Department refers to education and cultural exchanges as peopleto-people programs, and recently renewed its focus on these grassroots efforts.
For the first time since 1979, the United States now sponsors people-to-people
programs with Iran, including meetings between clergy, students, teachers and
journalists. Through advocating programs such as these, the State Department
sends an important message to foreign and domestic audiences: for public
diplomacy to be effective and make a real difference, it need not be glamorous. It
does not have to come in the form of a prestigious educational exchange, like
Fulbright, and it should not have to involve a perfectly coordinated plan to target
the media. Individuals—teachers, lawyers, students, religious leaders—can make
a significant difference in America’s image abroad. This concept echoes the calls
for a new type of public diplomacy, its focus being not only on foreign audiences,
but also on domestic involvement.
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Improvements to information programs
Two important factors in the improvement of the information component of
the State Department include private sector involvement and the development of
rapid response units. The contributions of the private sector during Hughes’
tenure totaled over $800 million, more than half the annual budget of the Office of
the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy. State has partnered with the private
sector to provide disaster relief, to establish education and health programs, and to
make American embassies and airports welcoming to visitors. This indirect
approach has greatly expanded the means of public diplomacy and serves to
demonstrate goodwill on the part of American businesses.
A newly-formed Rapid Response Unit constantly monitors foreign media
on radio, television and the Internet. This unit immediately sees how America is
being portrayed around the world, compiles that information in a daily e-mail and
sends it to thousands of high-ranking government officials, including ambassadors
and military personnel. Ignorance is no longer a valid excuse. Along these same
lines, regional media hubs have been established, allowing Arabic speakers to
interact with local media on behalf of the American government. This means that
an “American perspective” on a number of issues will be delivered in Arabic in
Middle Eastern media outlets, allowing American surrogates to speak directly to
foreign audiences instead of through loose translations.
A focus on rapid response is evident in this year’s report released by the
Broadcasting Board of Governors. There are efforts to create programming to
33

respond to crises and events worldwide: “On September 27, 2007, VOA Burmese
doubled its daily broadcast from 1.5 to three original hours daily in response to the
massive nationwide demonstrations against the military junta and the ensuing
crackdown.” 39 Similar adjustments were made in Pakistan when a state of
emergency was declared in late 2007, and also in Somalia and Zimbabwe during
recent political and humanitarian crises. An important addition to the broadcasting
capability of VOA was the creation of a Persian News Network, which is seen and
heard by a quarter of Iranians every week.40 This type of reactionary
programming demonstrates flexibility and a commitment to relating to the events
in the lives of foreign audiences.

V. Policy Recommendations
Many significant adjustments have been made affecting the implementation
of public diplomacy. As a result, the government critically evaluated its past
failures in public diplomacy and tried new tactics. Of course, not enough time has
passed to know whether or not these changes will have a positive long-term effect
on America’s relationship with a number of key allies, especially those in the
Middle East. The recommendations offered here are drawn from the many factors
so far outlined in this essay.
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1. Public diplomacy should have higher prioritization in the foreign policy
process. Public diplomacy officials should be included in high-level
meetings so they can inform fellow policymakers about public opinion
abroad. Being part of the decision-making process can only have positive
effects on an official’s ability to devise a useful strategy to win foreign
support.
2. American officials must engage more regularly with foreign media.
Limiting contact with foreign media to high-profile trips abroad makes the
interaction seem too much like a publicity stunt. If the American President
or Secretary of State were more accessible to foreign media, it would lead
to increased quantity and quality of coverage.
3. The State Department must dramatically improve its training of
ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers. As it stands now, ambassadors
receive just a few weeks of training before deployment, and little attention
is given to public diplomacy. As a spokesperson for America, an
ambassador should have daily interaction with the press in her/his host
country. S/he should be the strongest advocate of grassroots public
diplomacy, arranging visits between American and foreign businesspeople,
policymakers, academics and students.
4. The government must continue to work closely with American
multinational corporations. Embassies and consulates should work to foster
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good relationships with American companies abroad, forging partnerships
to expose locals to American culture.
5. Money is a crucial factor for public diplomacy, as with any government
entity. Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes worked hard to increase
Congressional appropriations for public diplomacy. According to the
Congressional Research Service, funding nearly doubled during her twoyear tenure at State. Yet it remains just over 1% of the total State
Department budget, and it pales in comparison with the hundreds of billions
of dollars appropriated to the Pentagon and supplemental war funding
packages. Money could make the most significant difference in educational
exchanges. With proper funding, the State Department could work with
American universities to send more students abroad each year. If
embassies abroad provided students with improved information and
opportunities to interact with the local culture, it would foster a sense of
engagement for American students abroad. 41
6. Improving credibility should be addressed at the highest levels.
Dispatching so-called “goodwill ambassadors” gives a human face to
foreign policy, and establishes credibility. Indirect approaches should also
be adopted, using our allies to carry our messages.
7. The government must stabilize the organization of public diplomacy.
Adjustments should be made as needed, but a vast overhaul of the entire
41
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system, such as those that took place in the 1950’s, 1970’s and 1990’s,
interrupt public diplomacy efforts. Just as consistency in messaging is
important, consistency within the organization would have a positive effect.
8. Academia must make room for the study of public diplomacy.
Quantitatively study is challenging because of the time lag between the
collection of data and its release. If public diplomacy is more critically
analyzed and studied by researchers and students, it will have a trickle-up
effect within the policy establishment. When universities produce a class
of scholars on public diplomacy, the government must utilize their unique
knowledge through recruiting them as Foreign Service officers and policy
planners.
9. The government should use its greatest resource: the American people.
There are 300 million potential citizen diplomats living in the United
States. Efforts must be made to educate Americans about the impact they
can have by taking part in foreign exchange programs. Public diplomacy
can take place in average American homes—by hosting an international
student, by keeping an international pen-pal, by blogging about daily life.
The data show that the opinion of Americans as people remains more
popular than America as a government. We must use this circumstance to
our advantage.
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VI. Conclusion
In various Middle East countries, heavy government control over print and
broadcast media continues to obfuscate American messages. The only solution is
to use a more indirect approach, relying on allies and proxies and private sector
partners to deliver messages on behalf of America. 42 It is far better to continue
exposing foreign audiences to American culture, even if it must be done through a
moderator, than to allow unfriendly governments to distort American policies.
Indirect approaches shore up credibility and invite multiple players to take part in
the public diplomacy process.
An important collaboration took place in late 2007 between the Department
of State and the Walt Disney Company. A team from Disney created a sevenminute video entitled “Portraits of America,” which is now played on a loop at
every U.S. consulate and American point of entry. Thousands of people see this
video each day as they stand in line waiting to receive visas or to go through
customs. The video itself is simple—smiling faces, quaint scenery, sweeping
music—but it paints an important picture of America as a welcoming place, open
to visitors from anywhere in the world. This collaboration is important for two
reasons. First, it positively portrays America and seeks to make visitors feel
welcome before they have even left home. Second, this kind of partnership
between the public and private sector is the best solution for the funding and
organizational problems public diplomacy faces within the government. Disney
42
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generously donated its time, money and talent, and produced a product that is now
a part of every visitor’s American experience. Engaging the private sector in
public diplomacy is not only efficient, but will serve the long-term purpose of
fostering further collaboration, thus involving America’s best and brightest in the
process.
The greatest hindrance to public diplomacy—disregarding a lack of funding
and organizational instability—will continue to be the disagreement over whether
or not public diplomacy is effective or important. Not until domestic support is
built for public diplomacy will its efforts realize their full potential. As with most
domestic issues, there is a double-edged sword involved. Politicians do not want
to support a practice unless they believe it works; however, poorly funded and
badly organized efforts are never given a full-faith opportunity to demonstrate
what they can accomplish. Like so many things, effective public diplomacy
depends on allocating the appropriate resources, and allocation relies on
commitment. In a well-known game theory scenario in international relations,
when a nation commits to a task, the outcome is a function of relative effort. Even
though the game itself, in an article by Bruce Beuno de Mesquita and others,
studies conflict, the same principle holds true: “If the choice is to fight, then
leaders decide how many of their available resources they are prepared to commit
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to the war effort.” 43 Similarly, if America wants to commit to a credible and
effective public diplomacy, it must decide what portion of its resources it is
willing to allocate. If the policy community and the academic community would
collaborate to give clear examples of when public diplomacy has been successful,
American politicians would perhaps be more inclined to support such allocation
and commitment. Unlike economic or military affairs, there is little hard data
associated with public diplomacy, which makes it seem intangible. Accurately
measuring its effects would have a tremendous impact, but collecting so much
data would require intense collaboration between the government and scholars.
Joseph Nye, who is a leading scholar on soft power, writes that soft power is “not
just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the
United States wants.” 44 The potential of public diplomacy must not be
underestimated, and it deserves to be studied. In the meantime, those who believe
in the power of public diplomacy must continue in its advocacy. Engaging
Americans in public diplomacy will create many positive outcomes: Americans
taking interest in their country, foreign audiences having a more favorable view of
the American government, and a restored sense of positive American influence
worldwide.
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VII. Appendix
1. Budget breakdown of State and Foreign Operations—the item line of special
interest to this essay are in bold and italics.
Department of State and Other International Programs
(In millions of dollars)
Estimate
2005
Actual 2006 2007
Spending
Discretionary Budget Authority:
Diplomatic and Consular Programs

4,202 4,304 4,652

Education and Cultural Exchange Programs
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance
International Peacekeeping
International Organizations
Economic Support Fund
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
Migration and Refugee Assistance
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining
Programs
Foreign Military Financing
Legislative proposal, Conflict Response Fund
Assistance for Eastern Europe and Baltic States
Assistance for Independent States of the Former
Soviet Union
Child Survival and Health
Development Assistance
International Disaster and Famine Assistance
USAID Operating Expenses
Broadcasting Board of Governors

378
1,504
483
1,166
2,391
1,374
493
725
764

426
1,470
1,022
1,151
2,621
1,975
472
727
783

474
1,540
1,135
1,269
3,215
2,894
796
722
833

384

406

449

4,746 4,465 4,551
—
—
75
308
357
274
462

441

1,573 1,569 1,433
1,445 1,488 1,261
466
361
349
610
624
679
594
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509

644

672

Department of State and Other International Programs
(In millions of dollars)

Millennium Challenge Corporation
Export-Import Bank
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Peace Corps
Multilateral Development Banks
Other State and International Programs
Food Aid (USDA PL 480 Title II) (non-add)
Total, Discretionary budget authority
Memorandum: Budget authority from enacted
supplementals
Total, Discretionary outlays
Total, Mandatory outlays
Total, Outlays
Credit activity
Direct Loan Disbursements:
Export-Import Bank
All other programs
Total, Direct loan disbursements
Guaranteed Loan Commitments:
Export-Import Bank
All other programs
Total, Guaranteed loan commitments

Estimate
2005
Actual 2006 2007
1,488 1,752 3,000
106
97
58
−180 −160 −160
317
319
337
1,219 1,277 1,329
1,494 1,521 1,583
1,173 1,139 1,219
28,512 30,182 33,859
4,737

162

—

29,808 30,762 32,384
−2,306 −2,209 −417
27,502 28,553 31,967

262
876
1,138

65
706
771

26
654
680

9,317 12,630 13,829
2,477 1,675 1,748
11,794 14,305 15,577
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